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COMMENTS 
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULE 12(E): MOTION 
FOR MoRE DEFINITE STATEMENT-HISTORY, OPERATION AND EF-
FICACY-In 1938 the Supreme Court, pursuant to congressional 
authorization, promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 
a general revision of the various procedural rules governing the 
conduct of litigation in the federal courts.2 Underlying this re-
vision was the philosophy that every individual should be assured 
the opportunity to obtain justice under the law. This aim was 
sought to be achieved primarily in two ways: first, by reducing 
procedural technicalities to a minimum, so that cases might be 
adjudicated on their merits regardless of attorneys' errors;3 and, 
secondly, by relieving congested court dockets, so that cases might 
reach trial before funds were exhausted and memories had faded.4 
The basic philosophy is summarized in the admonition that the 
Rules "shall be construed to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action."5 
Pursuant to the underlying philosophy of the Rules, the detail 
required to be stated in a complaint was greatly diminished.6 
Because a rather simple statement will fulfill the pleading require-
ments, in drafting a response to a complaint or preparing for 
trial it may be difficult to ascertain, by reference to the pleadings 
alone, precisely what issues have been raised or what allegations 
must be met. Consequently, the drafters of the Rules provided 
various techniques, including discovery devices,7 the pre-trial con-
ference, 8 and the motion for more definite statement, to aid in the 
determination of these matters. While discovery and pre-trial 
conferences are generally considered effective means for reducing 
l Since then a number of states have revised their procedural codes along the lines 
of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P.; COLO. R. CIV. P.; DEL. R. CIV. P.; 
KY. R. Cxv. P.; UTAH R. CIV. P. 
2 One body of rules under which the courts formerly operated was the Federal 
Equity Rules. The Equity Rules of 1912 are found in HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 
.ANNOTATED (7th ed. 1930). 
3 See Holtzoff, The New Civil Procedure in West Virginia, 26 F.R.D. 79, 81 (1960); 
36 IND. L.J. 360 (1961). 
4 See Chandler, Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedure in Federal Courts, 12 OKLA. L. 
REv. 321, 328 (1959). 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a): "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ..• shall 
contain . . • (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief . • . ." See the interpretation given Rule 8(a) by Judge Clark in 
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). 
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
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technicalities and helping to relieve congested dockets, the motion 
for more definite statement is commonly regarded as being used 
only by those wishing to delay or conceal their own knowledge.0 
Because of this view, many judges have adopted something akin 
to an a priori presumption against granting this motion which, if 
it does not cause an attorney to forego its use, even when his 
motive is valid, usually foretells the motion's judicial disposition. 
The purpose of this comment is to trace the history of the 
motion for more definite statement as provided for in the Federal 
Rules, analyze the reasons for granting or denying the motion, 
and propose an answer to the question of whether Rule 12(e) is 
necessary, or superfluous, as part of modern federal pleading pro-
cedure. 
I. HISTORY 
The pleading system originated by the New York Code of 
Civil Procedure10 in 1848 requires a plain statement of facts in 
language enabling an adversary to understand what is alleged.11 
When the allegations are so indefinite and uncertain that the pre-
cise meaning is not apparent, the court may, in a code pleading 
jurisdiction, order that the pleading be made more definite and 
certain when an appropriate motion is made.12 However, it is only 
where the exact nature of the cause of action is not apparent that 
the motion will be granted.13 Particulars of time and place may 
not be obtained through the device of a motion to make more 
definite and certain; rather, the answering party is relegated to 
use of the bill of particulars. 
At common law, the bill of particulars was a document setting 
forth and attacking the pleader's allegations which the answering 
party considered to be stated with insufficient definiteness. It was 
the proper recourse where the claim or defense set out in the 
pleading was sufficient as far as general allegations were concerned, 
but specific facts leading to the general conclusions alleged were 
o See Chandler, supra note 4, at 328. 
10 Commonly referred to as the "Field Code." See generally Coe & Morse, Chro• 
nology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942). 
11 See N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr: § 241. 
12 See N.Y. RuLES CIV. PRAc. § 102: "If any matter contained in a pleading is so 
indefinite, uncertain or obscure that the precise meaning or application thereof is 
not apparent, the court may order the party to serve such amended pleading as the 
case may require." 
13 Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N.Y. 176 (1874). See generally 2 .ABBOIT, TRIAL BRIEF 1923 
(1904); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES §§ 442-43 (5th ed. 1929). The New York concept car-
ried over to the other code states. See, e.g., Chicago & E.R.R. v. Lawrence, 169 Ind. 319, 
79 N.E. 363 (1906); Pierson v. Green, 69 S.C. 559, 48 S.E. 624 (1903). 
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being sought.14 A response to the bill of particulars could be re-
quired of a pleader in any type of action. In most code pleading 
states, the bill of particulars is the same as the common-law bill;15 
however, in some states, particulars may be obtained only in an 
action involving an account or money demands arising upon con-
tract.16 While the motion to make more definite and certain may 
be filed before the answer, the code bill of particulars may be filed 
only after the answer has been made.17 
As originally promulgated, Federal Rule 12(e) read: 
"Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive plead-
ing is permitted by these rules, within 20 days after the ser-
vice of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more 
definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter 
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particu-
larity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive plead-
ing or to prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the 
defects complained of and the details desired .... A bill of 
particulars when filed becomes a part of the pleading which 
it supplements." 
The committee formulating the Rules apparently failed to an-
ticipate some difficult problems which subsequently arose as a 
consequence of including the motion for a bill of particulars in 
Rule 12(e) as originally drafted. Use of the bill of particulars 
had been regarded as efficacious in preventing surprise and limit-
ing the issues, and, since resulting in the inclusion of more detail 
in the pleadings, it thereby enabled defendants to prepare for 
trial with the least expense.18 However, this was inconsistent with 
the generality in pleading permitted by the Federal Rules. Fur-
thermore, the discovery and pre-trial conference devices performed 
the same functions more effectively. Accordingly, there was fre-
quent abuse of Rule 12(e)'s provisions, as originally promulgated: 
first, by those who desired additional facts in complaints simply 
because they refused to accept the basic philosophy of generalized 
pleading; second, by those who wanted to embarrass their adver-
14 See 2 .ABBoTl', op. cit. supra note 13, at 1943. See generally CLA!Ut, CODE PLEADING 
§ 54 (2d ed. 1947). 
15 See, e.g., N.Y. RULES CIV. PRAc. § 115: "Any party may require any other party 
to give a bill of particulars of his claim • • • by serving a written notice stating the 
items concerning which such particulars are desired." 
16 See, e.g., Price v. Bouteiller, 79 Conn. 255, 64 Atl. 227 (1906); Board of County 
Comm'rs v. American Loan 8e Trust Co., 75 Minn. 489, 78 N.W. 113 (1899). 
17 Updike v. Mace, 156 App. Div. 381, 141 N.Y. Supp. 587 (1913). 
l,8 See Caskey 8e Young, The Bill of Particulars-A Brief for the Defendant, 27 VA. 
L. R.Ev. 472, 474 (1941). 
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saries or to delay;19 and, third, by those who desired more informa-
tion, without resorting to discovery, than that which they alleged 
had been pleaded "ambiguously or indefinitely" in the complaint. 
In response to the overwhelming number of such motions made,20 
some courts refused to grant the motion when the movant's sole 
motive was to acquire additional information "to prepare for 
trial."21 Others equated the filing of a bill of particulars to the 
making of a motion for more definite statement, and refused to 
grant the motion where it was made solely to elicit facts not 
pleaded, irrespective of the purpose for which the information 
was desired.22 Finally, in 1948, on the recommendation of the 
Advisory Committee,23 Rule 12(e) was amended to read: 
"If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted 
is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be 
required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for 
a more definite statement before interposing his responsive 
pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained 
of and the details desired .... " 
Thus, the bill of particulars was finally deleted from the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to the chagrin of only a few.M 
With the demise of the bill of particulars there has also been 
a diminution in the judicially reported use of the motion for more 
definite statement. A ruling on such motion is interlocutory in 
nature and cannot be immediately appealed, but usually must 
await the final decree.25 If it does survive trial, the party wishing 
to appeal the determination on the motion will have to shoulder 
19 See Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 
155 (1953). 
20 In Stayton 8: Boner, The Plastic Code in Operation, 36 TEXAS L. REv. 561, 572 
(1958), the authors note that in 1943 alone twenty-one pages of the Federal Rules 
Service were required merely to index cases deciding what particulars would or would 
not justify granting of the motion. 
21 See James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules, 71 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 1473, 1476 (1958). 
22 See IA BARRON 8: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 412 (1960). 
23 See ADVISORY COMM, ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED .AMEND• 
MENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR TIIE DISTRICT COURTS OF TIIE UNITED STATES 
9 (1946). 
24 A vigorous dissent to any elimination of the bill of particulars had been presented 
at an earlier date by Caskey &: Young, supra note 18. They presented the side of the 
defendant's attorney to whom, they argued, the bill of particulars was an "invaluable 
aid," Id. at 472. 
25 See Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F,2d 126 (5th Cir. 1959); IA BARRON 
&: HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 22, at 462. However, it is possible that an interlocutory 
appeal might be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1958), where "an immediate appeal 
• • • may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 
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the heavy burden of showing an abuse of judicial discretion.26 
These factors account for the paucity of federal circuit court of 
appeals and Supreme Court decisions construing the Rule. Mo-
tions for more definite statement arise in the federal district courts 
much more frequently than the published decisions indicate, and 
are not reported because of the rather perfunctory treatment ac-
corded them by district court judges.27 Only forty-one decisions 
on Rule 12(e) motions have been published during the period 
from 1957 through 1962.28 In approximately one-third of the cases 
-fourteen-the motion was granted; the remaining twenty-seven 
cases involved orders denying the motion. This particular period 
of time was selected for concentration in this comment because it 
presumably is sufficiently removed from the date of amendment 
to ensure that the new motion for more definite statement was not 
confused with the old bill of particulars. Moreover, these recent 
cases should provide a fairly accurate indication of what may be 
expected in the future. 
Il. APPROPRIATE GROUNDS FOR GRANTING OR DENYING 
A RULE 12(E) MOTION 
To grant a Rule 12(e) motion properly, the court must decide 
that the pleading is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading."20 Liter-
ally interpreted, the phrase "vague or ambiguous" obviously ap-
plies to a pleading the terminology of which is capable of having 
two or more possible meanings. Usually, however, the phrase is 
interpreted to include also the pleading which, on the whole, is 
so indefinite and uncertain that the opposing party cannot be 
expected to understand the "nature of the claim."30 As used here, 
"nature of the claim" refers to the legal wrong for which the 
20 That the disposition of the motion does rest in the trial court's discretion has 
been stated in several cases. See, e.g., Etablissements Neyrpic v. Elmer C. Gardner, Inc., 
175 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Tex. 1959). 
27 The writer's personal research in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan discloses that motions for more definite statement arise with much 
more frequency than is revealed by written opinions in reported cases. This was verified 
in a discussion with Judge Talbot Smith, of the Federal District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, Oct. 6, 1962. Judge Smith also noted that a major reason for the 
large volume of such motions is "the carryover into the federal system of a practice 
commonly employed in state courts not having a discovery practice as liberal as that 
of the federal courts." 
28 See Appendix at end of this comment for a complete listing of the cases. 
29 FED. R. C1v. P. 12(e). 
ao Cf. Hartman Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Prime Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Wis. 1949); 
Walling v. American S.S. Co., 4 F.R.D. 355 (W.D.N.Y. 1945). 
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plaintiff is seeking redress-for example, a claim for personal 
injury based upon defendant's negligence, the elements of which 
would be duty, breach, causation and resulting injury. Whether 
the court can understand the "nature of the claim" by reference 
to the pleading will probably be a key determinant in deciding 
if a particular pleading is so defective that the 12(e) motion should 
be granted. 
In most federal courts, the requirement of stating the "nature 
of the claim" is satisfied when the claimant sets out the elements 
showing that a legal ·wrong has been committed and that he is 
entitled to relief.31 These courts interpret the Federal Rules as 
doing away with the narrow "theory of the pleadings" doctrine 
which requires, in part, that the pleader clearly designate each 
separate legal theory that he intends to rely upon.32 Judge Clark 
has stated: 
"A simple statement in sequence of the events which have 
transpired, coupled with a direct claim by way of demand for 
judgment of what the plaintiff expects and hopes to recover, 
is a measure of clarity and safety; and even the demand for 
judgment loses its restrictive nature when the parties are at 
issue, for particular legal theories of counsel yield to the 
court's duty to grant the relief to which the prevailing party 
is entitled, whether demanded or not."33 
Once the elements of the claim are clearly set forth, the ques-
tion then arises as to whether the motion for more definite state-
ment might nevertheless be granted if the movant claims that 
insufficient facts are stated in the pleading. Code pleading rules 
require that a complaint contain a "statement of facts constituting 
a cause of action."34 Some federal courts, having read this require-
ment into the Federal Rules, expect the plaintiff to plead the 
particular facts upon which the claim is based. Thus, when a 
31 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), in which the Court noted that the 
Federal Rules do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he 
bases his claim. The Court stated: "To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short 
and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 47. See also the various 
federal forms which are sufficient for use in pleadings under the Rules. Form 6, for 
example, which is a complaint for money lent, requires no more than: "Defendant owes 
plaintiff ten thousand dollars for money lent by plaintiff to defendant on June I, 1936." 
32 See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 14, § 43. 
33 Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1945). 
34 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Ac:r § 241. (Emphasis added.) See CLARK, op. cit. supra 
note 14, § 19, for an explanation of the various interpretations given the term "cause of 
action." 
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12(e) motion is made for the purpose of eliciting further informa-
tion, it is usually granted, the rationale being that the opposing 
party has not received sufficient notice. But these courts appear 
to be incorrectly granting the motion when all the elements of a 
legal wrong have been pleaded, and they are in effect thereby 
enabling the movant to secure additional facts which can prop-
erly be obtained through discovery.35 This approach emphasizes 
fact pleading and improperly detracts from the concept of notice 
pleading which the drafters of the Rules sought to effectuate. 
Thus, there has been a tendency, on the part of some federal courts, 
to bring the bill of particulars back into the Federal Rules.36 
Illustratively, the motion for more definite statement has been 
granted-incorrectly-to enable the responding party to ascertain 
the date or dates on which the allegedly illegal acts took place37 
and to allow the defendant to educe which of plaintiff's numerous 
trademarks, patents, or copyrights he allegedly infringed.38 Fur-
thermore, the motion has been granted to allow the movant to 
determine with whom it allegedly conspired to violate the law,39 
to ascertain the names of employees who allegedly acted on its 
behalf,40 and to learn which statutes it allegedly violated.41 In 
all of these cases, the movant seems to have had notice of the 
"nature of the claim," since the elements of a legal wrong had 
adequately been pleaded. Moreover, the additional facts being 
sought were not necessary to permit the movant to frame an ade-
quate response. 
Therefore, it is seemingly erroneous to interpret the phrase 
"nature of the claim" to mean anything more than, for example, 
the elements of a claim for negligence or breach of contract. 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Schofield, 152 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1957). Plaintiff, 
in an attempt to collect unpaid income taxes, sued to recover the alleged cost of improve-
ments made by the deceased taxpayer on land in which he had a life estate. Although 
defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, it was treated as a motion for 
· more definite statement and granted for the purpose of obtaining a more adequate 
description of the alleged improvements. 
86 See text accompanying note 48 infra, as to the denial of a motion for more definite 
statement because movant is actually seeking a bill of particulars. 
87 See Buchholtz v. Renard, 188 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Kuenzell v. United 
States, 20 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1957). 
38 See Lincoln Labs., Inc. v. Savage Labs., Inc., 26 F.R.D. 141 (D. Del. 1960); Marvel 
Slide Fastener Corp. v. Klozo Fastener Corp., 80 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
39 See, e.g., George W. Warner &: Co. v. Black &: Decker Mfg. Co., 167 F. Supp. 860 
(E.D. Pa. 1958). 
40 See Syan Holding Corp. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 20 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. 
Pa. 1957). 
41 See, e.g., Sanitized, Inc. v. S. C. Johnson &: Sons, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 
1959). 
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"Vague or ambiguous" should be construed to mean so mixed up, 
so incoherent, that, although the complaint might well state a 
claim, it is practicably impossible to discern the "nature of the 
claim." The pleading of a party appearing prose would, in some 
instances, probably provide a good illustration of such a confused 
complaint.42 However, so long as the answering party has sufficient 
notice of the claim to enable him to respond, the motion should 
be denied. The responding party is not required to deny or admit 
all allegations, but can state that he is "without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an aver-
ment."48 Moreover, the Rules do not call for a perfect answer 
or one that will precisely frame the issues. It was stated in regard 
to the complaint in Wilson v. Illinois Gent. R.R.: 
"Want of detail in a pleading is not a fatal vice so long as 
the complaint is not so vague or ambiguous that a party 
cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive plead-
ing . . . . The complaint here attacked, while not a model 
of verbal precision, is sufficient to apprise the defendant of 
enough to permit it to file an answer."44 
Of course, the defendant may still need additional details to en-
able him to prepare for trial. The proper procedure to be used 
is discovery, 45 rather than the motion for more definite statement.46 
This conclusion flows principally from the fact that the phrase 
"or to prepare for trial" was deleted from the wording of Rule 
12(e) as amended in 1948.47 Furthermore, if it appears to the 
court that the motion is being used in substance as a bill of par-
42 An example may be Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), where 
Judge Clark held the complaint good as against a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted. It seems that, if a motion for more definite 
statement had been made, it might well have been granted. Concerning the complaint, 
the court stated: "We may pass certain of his claims as either inadequate or inadequately 
stated and consider only these two: (1) that on the auction day, October 9, 1940, 
when defendant sold the merchandise at 'public custom,' 'he sold my merchandise to 
another bidder with my price of $HO, and not of his price of $120,' and (2) 'that three 
weeks before the sale, two cases, of 19 bottles each case, disappeared.' Plaintiff does not 
make wholly clear how these goods came into the collector's hands, since he alleges 
compliance with the revenue laws; but he does say he made a claim for 'refund of 
merchandise which was two-thirds paid in Milano, Italy' and the collector denied the 
claim.'' 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b). 
44 147 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1957). 
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
40 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 23 F.R.D. 101 (S.D. Ind. 1958); Mitchell 
v. Independent Stave Co., 159 F. Supp. 829 0,V .D. Mo. 1957). 
47 Contrast Rule 12(e) as originally enacted with the amended Rule, as discussed in 
the text at notes 23-24 supra. 
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ticulars to secure additional information, the motion will be de-
nied and the movant advised to resort to discovery.48 
A few courts,49 in requiring the complainant to plead addi-
tional facts, have done so on the ground that he has failed to meet 
the requirement of Rule S(a) that a complaint shall contain "a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief."50 These courts find some "residual meaning" 
in Rule S(a) which seemingly indicates that more facts than are 
necessary for a general statement of the elements of the claim 
must be pleaded in order to convey a "plain statement of the 
claim." Such an interpretation seems tenuous at best, for Rule 
S(a) conveys the theory, implicit throughout the Federal Rules 
and illustrated in Form 8,51 that a bare statement of the elements 
of the claim is all the notice that is required to be given in the 
complaint.52 In fact, other courts have frequently-and correctly 
-referred to Rule S(a) in determining that the motion for more 
definite statement should be denied where defendant has re-
ceived sufficient notice. A court may actually cite Rule 8 and 
hold that the pleading is sufficient to comply with its standards;53 
or, without specifically citing S(a), it may state that more particu-
larity than the complaint contains is not required by the Rules.54 
Rules S(a) and 12(e) are so interrelated that any time the 12(e) 
motion is denied it seems apparent that the pleader has met the 
requirements of Rule S(a).55 
On the other hand, the Federal Rules require that certain 
48 See, e.g., Acoustica Associates, Inc. v. Powertron Ultrasonics Corp., 28 F.R.D. 16 
(E.D.N.Y. 1961); Cmax, Inc. v. Hall, 290 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1961) (dictum). 
49 See, e.g., Fennell v. Svenska Amerika Linien A/B, 23 F.R.D. 116 (D. Mass. 1958); 
Westland Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire &: Rubber Co., 3 F.R.D. 55 (D.N.D. 1943). 
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
51 FED. FORM 8: "Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for money had and 
received from one G.H. on June 1, 1936, to be paid by defendants to plaintiff." 
52 See Re v. Fullop, 22 F.R.D. 52 (E.D. Ill. 1958); IA BARRON &: HOLTZOFF, op. cit. 
supra note 22, at 53. 
53 See, e.g., Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959), where 
the court asserted: "In view of the great liberality of Federal Rule ..• 8, permitting notice 
pleading, it is clearly the policy of the Rules that Rule 12(e) should not be used to 
frustrate this policy by lightly requiring a plaintiff to amend his complaint which under 
Rule 8 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." 
54 See, e.g., Colton v. Wonder Drug Corp., 21 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); MacDonald 
v. Astor, 21 F.R.D. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
55 This is accomplished by saying that the complaint is not "vague or ambiguous" 
within Ruic 12(c) if it includes a "plain statement of the claim" within Rule 8(a); and, 
conversely, if the complaint is "vague or ambiguous," then it does not contain a "plain 
statement of the claim." 
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matters be pleaded with particularity.56 For instance, Rule 9(b)57 
demands that "all averments of fraud or mistake shall be stated 
with particularity." Thus, in Freedman v. Philadelphia Termi-
nals Auction Co.58 the plaintiff's second count was essentially an 
allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation. As to this count, de-
fendant moved for a more definite statement, and, because the 
allegation did not comply with Rule 9(b), the court granted the 
motion. Although utilization of the 12(e) motion appears to be 
a valid method for obtaining the missing details, it seems that a 
court, in granting it, may be allowing a misuse of the motion. 
The purpose of the motion is to enable defendant to understand 
what has been included in the complaint, not to give plaintiff the 
chance to supply particulars necessary to a claim. If a court finds 
that the pleading is not vague or ambiguous, it should deny the 
motion and suggest that the plaintiff supply the missing essen-
tials, 59 or that the defendant file a motion to dismiss for "failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."60 
III. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RULING ON THE MOTION 
Additional considerations may be important in arriving at a 
decision on the granting or denying of a 12(e) motion. These 
factors alone may be sufficient as a basis for a ruling on such a 
motion, but often they are only auxiliary to the court's main 
rationale. If the particular information being sought is within 
the movant's own knowledge, a 12(e) motion would probably be 
denied.61 Although such a reason is rarely the sole basis for de-
nying the motion, it is still a significant factor. In Etablissements 
Neyrpic v. Elmer C. Gardner, Inc.,62 although the 12(e) motion 
was denied primarily because discovery was available, the court 
made it clear that it was unnecessary to include the requested 
information in the complaint since it was within the defendant's 
own knowledge. Such reasoning appears to be readily justifiable. 
The complainant has given notice of the claim, and the opposing 
party is aware of the allegations which must be answered. There-
r;o Thus, there are a few, but very few, exceptions to the requirement of the Federal 
Rules that the pleader need give only notice of the nature of his claim. 
57 Fm. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
58 145 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1956). 
59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
60 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
01 See, e.g., Philadelphia Retail Jewelers Ass'n v. L. &: C. Mayers, 1 F.R.D. 606 (E.D. 
Pa. 1941). 
02 175 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Tex. 1959). 
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fore, the movant should be made to draw from his own knowledge 
in responding and not be allowed to impose a burden on the com-
plainant to amplify his pleading with matters already known. 
Another factor frequently considered relevant is the existence 
of an intention on the part of the movant to follow the 12(e) 
motion with a motion for dismissal or judgment on the pleadings, 
once the nature of the claim is determinable. Thus, the 12(e) 
motion has been denied on the ground that to grant it "would 
be a misuse of the rule. Its function is to enable the movant to 
prepare a responsive pleading and not to serve as a forerunner 
for a motion to dismiss."63 Such reasoning seems questionable~ 
If the pleading to be answered is so "vague or ambiguous that 
a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive 
pleading," why should the moving party's motive determine 
whether the motion should be granted? Any complaint which 
fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted" is subject 
to dismissal. The method by which it is ascertained that there is 
no claim upon which relief can be granted should be irrelevant.64 
Finally, a 12(e) motion, which was unopposed by the pleader, 
has been granted in two different types of situations. On the one 
hand, when the plaintiff conceded that the complaint' should be 
more definite, the court was clearly justified in granting the 
motion.65 But, where the court's sole reason for granting the mo-
tion was the lack of opposition by the plaintiff,66 the result seems 
less justifiable. The burden is imposed upon the court to deter-
mine, in its sound discretion,67 whether the complaint is vague 
or ambiguous. The motion should not be granted unless the com-
plaint is so indefinite that defendant cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to formulate a responsive pleading. Whether plaintiff has 
opposed the motion should have no bearing on the court's deci-
sion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The reasons advanced by federal courts for granting or deny-
ing the motion for more definite statement have encompassed a 
63 Harrington v. Yellin, 158 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1958); accord, Lodge 743, 
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 30 F.R.D. 142 (D. Conn. 1962); 
Cather v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., IO F.R.D. 437 (D. Neb. 1950). 
64 Perhaps what these courts are really saying is that the complaint is sufficient and 
the movant is just trying to get more facts. 
65 See Mil-Hall Textile Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958). 
66 See, e.g., Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959). 
67 See note 26 supra. 
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range far greater than was intended when Rule 12(e) was 
adopted.68 Rule 12(e) was modeled after the Field Code motion 
to make more definite and certain, which was granted when the 
pleading was so incoherent that the moving party could not 
reasonably understand that to which he must respond. If only 
the word "ambiguous" had been used in Rule 12(e), then perhaps 
the courts would have granted the motion only when the plead-
ing to be answered was so confusing that a response could not 
reasonably be made. The word "vague" connotes the idea of a 
lack of sufficient detail and specificity. Perhaps the inclusion of 
this alternative standard-vagueness-has provided the basis for 
granting the 12(e) motion to allow the moving party to obtain 
additional facts. This usage, however, goes beyond the purpose 
for which the motion was intended. It probably reads the old 
bill of particulars into the "more definite statement" concept; and, 
at the very least, it creates a substitute for discovery.69 Whether 
this usage brings back the bill of particulars or creates an alterna-
tive to discovery, it seems incorrect and, as such, should not be 
allowed. 
The motion for more definite statement, nevertheless, may 
have a usefulness beyond clearing up the mixed-up pleading. 
In the so-called "big case," such as extended antitrust litigation, 
an order made pursuant to a 12(e) motion requiring the pleader 
to include specific details in his allegations may save the movant 
both time and expense which might be lost if he were forced 
to rely entirely upon discovery and pre-trial conferences. For 
example, in a suit charging conspiracy to monopolize part of a 
trade or business, 70 such an allegation alone may be construed as 
giving defendant sufficient notice of the "nature of the claim." 
The defendant cannot always be expected to be cognizant of what 
act or acts, performed at what times, and with what parties, the 
plaintiff is complaining. In these circumstances the 12(e) motion 
could provide an economical means for the defendant to ascer-
tain the particular acts referred to by the plaintiff in his complaint. 
Thus, such use should be allowed even though technically in-
correct. 71 However, the great majority of cases arising in the federal 
68 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N INSTITUTE, FEDERAL Rur.Es OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, at 41, 242 (Wash. and N.Y. 1938). 
60 In James, supra note 21, at 147!!-76, the point is made that through the wide range 
of information afforded to the person obtaining discovery today, we are perhaps bringing 
the bills of particulars into the Federal Rules all over again. 
70 See Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). 
71 But see the opinion of Judge Clark in Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 326 
(2d Cir. 1957). 
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courts are not the "big cases," and so, ordinarily, no such justifiable 
misuse of the motion should be permitted. 
In view of the fact that the use of the motion for more defi-
nite statement has been so significantly diverted from its original 
purpose of clearing up pleadings to which a response could not 
reasonably be required, it is now questionable whether the mo-
tion should be retained in the Federal Rules. As has been noted, 
the granting of the motion creates delay. Furthermore, alternative 
means are available for accomplishing results presently being 
achieved through the improper use of Rule 12(e). Discovery is 
available for the elicitation of facts; and discovery may be ob-
tained prior to the filing of a responsive pleading,72 although it 
has thus far been infrequently used in such a manner. The motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted73 should be used where it appears that the pleader has 
not actually stated a claim. If a claim is found not to have been 
stated, the pleader should be given leave to amend, 74 with the 
claim being dismissed if he does not do so. 
It would thus appear that the motion for more definite state-
ment, as frequently used in contemporary federal pleading and 
practice, is superfluous and unnecessary. There are two possible 
methods of dealing with it. The first, and least satisfactory, would 
be to delete the motion entirely from the provisions of the Federal 
Rules. This would eliminate any possibility of misuse of the 
motion, but, on the other hand, it would also prevent any use of 
the motion to assist the responding party by facilitating his under-
standing of the truly mixed-up, or incoherent, pleading. And 
under the Federal Rules it seems to be the only motion which 
could be used to clear up such a pleading. It might also result in 
an unnecessary rash of motions to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim,75 which could become as misused as the motion for more 
definite statement now is. The second method, here proposed, is 
to eliminate the words "vague or" from the wording of the Rule. 
This should eliminate the use of the motion to obtain facts or 
evidence from the complainant and would properly relegate the 
responding party to the use of discovery procedures for such in-
72 Rule 26 allows the taking of a deposition any time "after commencement of an 
action." Rule 3 states: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
court." Thus, discovery is available any time after the complaint is filed. Furthermore, 
a deposition may be available, even before an action is commenced, under Rule 27. 
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
74 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
75 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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formation. With only the word "ambiguous" remaining, the 
courts would be more likely to constrain themselves to granting 
the motion only where the pleading appears to be so confusing 
that the adverse party could not reasonably be expected to frame 
a responsive pleading, and the motion for more definite state-
ment would have an added potency and usefulness in litigation 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Stefan F. Tucker, S.Ed. 
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